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Chapter 2   
"The ghosts I called I can't get rid of now": The Keynes-Tinbergen-Friedman-
Phillips Critique of Keynesian Macroeconometrics 
 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 This chapter offers a fresh perspective on the much publicised dispute between 
those followers of Keynes who presented econometric evidence in favour of a Phillips 
curve trade-off, and those monetarists who presented counter econometric evidence. 
Contrary to common perceptions, the collapse of the Keynesian Phillips curve was a 
vindication of a common critique of macroeconometric practices, which was jointly 
authored by John Maynard Keynes, Jan Tinbergen, Milton Friedman and A.W.H. 'Bill' 
Phillips.  This analysis is informed by the usual sources, plus two sources which had been 
thought to be no longer in existence (Phillips' private papers and the London School of 
Economics (LSE) Methodology, Measurement and Testing (M2T) Staff Seminar records), 
plus two essays by Keynes (1938a, 1938b) which have been overlooked in this context. 
 
Keynes' critique of econometrics can be disaggregated into three distinct categories: 
namely, technical issues that could be overcome by further research; criticisms that were 
directed at macroeconometrics, but not necessarily at microeconometrics; plus concerns 
about the possibility that econometrics, in the wrong hands, would become a hazard for 
the economics profession.  Econometricians have long been aware that Keynes' detailed 
technical criticism were sometimes ill-founded (Robert Gordon 1949, 53, n4).  Since this 
first category of Keynes' critique is not germane to the theme of this chapter, these can be 
safely relegated to a footnote.i  
 
This framework is used to marshal evidence in favour of four propositions.  The first 
(section 2.3) is that Tinbergen acknowledged the validity of the central thrust of Keynes' 
critique of the more mechanical aspects of the econometric practices that were developing 
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in the late 1930s; practices that had been unwittingly stimulated by the General Theory 
(Stone 1978, 62; Tinbergen 1947).  The second proposition (section 2.4) is that there is a 
considerable overlap between the views of Keynes and Friedman with respect to 
econometrics .   
 
The third proposition (section 2.4) is that Friedman (who during World War II, was 
Deputy Director of the Statistical Research Group, and who must be regarded as one of 
the most statistically literate economists of all time) was implicitly predicting that 
macroeconometric disputation could only end inconclusively.  In the late 1950s, there 
was a changing of the Keynesian guard in Cambridge, Massachusetts, with Alvin Hansen, 
who was sceptical about econometrics, making way for younger Keynesians who 
apparently did not share these doubts.  1958 was a pivotal year in macroeconomic history: 
it was the year of Phillips' seminal empirical paper; and around this time, the Senator 
from Massachusetts began to mobilise his "academic Kennedy gang" at Cambridge 
(Halberstam 1972, 157; Leeson 1997a, 1997b).  It was also the year that H.S. 
Houthakker, on study leave at Harvard, chose to engage Friedman (1957) in an 
econometric dispute over the relative merits of rival consumption functions.  This may 
also explain why the anti-Keynesian counter-revolution, when it came, was monetarist 
and not Austrian (section 2.4).   
 
The fourth proposition (section 2.5) is that Phillips was an insightful early critic of 
Keynesian Phillips Curve econometrics.  This section is based, in part, on the recently 
discovered - and complete - seminar records of the LSE Staff Seminar on Methodology, 
Measurement and Testing (M2T).  This section, therefore, supplements Neil de Marchi's 
(1988) fascinating discussion, which was based on the best - but incomplete - records 
then available.  Some concluding remarks are provided in section 2.6.  A brief historical 
introduction is provided in section 2.2. 
 
2.1.2 Econometrics has had some success stories; it has also had some less impressive 
episodes.  More importantly, it has become an ambiguous, but high status language, 
engaging a large share of professional effort.  According to George Stigler (1962a, 1), the 
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statistical evaluation of economic relationships is the only distinctive trait of modern 
economics; but in 1912, Fisher had been unable to find enough interested people (apart 
from W.C. Mitchell and a few others) to establish an Econometric Society.  This Society 
was ultimately founded by only sixteen people, at a meeting at the Statler Hotel, 
Cleveland, Ohio, in December 1930; the first European meeting of the Society, in 
Lausanne in 1931, attracted about twenty people; and the first edition of Econometrica 
had a circulation of less than 300 (Cowles 1960, 173-4; Frisch 1970, 152; Christ 1952, 5; 
Bjerkholt 1995, 755).  But today, econometrics occupies a large proportion of the pages 
of the professional journals, and according to Darnell and Evans (1990, ix) some see 
econometrics as an "umbrella discipline for economics".   
Some econometricians have made an impressive theoretical contribution to statistical 
analysis; but doubts remain about the value of the 'average economic regression'.  In the 
pre-econometric age, the average academic economist could aspire to become an 
authority on some aspect of the economy; now, it seems, many economists find that 
professional advancement is more easily facilitated by applying (or misapplying) 
estimating techniques to data - the quality or relevance of which often remains 
unexamined - in spite of Keynes' warnings. 
 
The econometric pioneers had great hopes that they were uncovering a 'rock' upon which 
to base reliable policy advice (Frisch 1970).  But later econometricians (Pagan 1984, 103) 
have been scathing about the research strategy which underpinned the econometric 
models of the 1960s, which appeared to suggest that inflation would reduce 
unemployment.  Econometricians (Laidler 1985) have also been concerned that the 
unemployment cost of reducing inflation - the dominant policy derived from 'natural rate' 
econometric models from the 1970s onwards - was much greater than anticipated by 
those econometric models.  An investigation into the origins of this unwarranted 
confidence in macroeconometric models is also, simultaneously, an investigation into the 
origins of these policy failures. 
 
Despite Schumpeter's (1933, 5) protestations, many econometricians have neglected, if 
not "belittle[d]", a superbly rich data source - the serial dependent history of their own 
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subject. If the history of econometrics stood in equal status along side other sub-
disciplines within economics, this might tend to alleviate some of the rather disturbing 
problems with regard to both graduate education and professional incentives: "something 
is terribly wrong in the economics profession and in the incentives that economists 
perceive ... in economics normal science has run amok.  The invisible hand of truth has 
lost its guiding influence" (Colander 1989, 31, 34-5; Colander and Klamer 1988). 
 
2.2  Historical Background 
The econometrics movement was moulded, to a large extent, by the desire to understand 
and tame the inter-war business cycle.  In April 1928, Charles F. Roos, Ragnar Frisch and 
Irving Fisher met, at Fisher's home in New Haven, to set in motion the ball that would 
lead to the Econometric Society.  In 1931, Alfred Cowles discontinued his forecasting 
service, explaining to his clients that he was insufficiently informed about the nature of 
business and stock market fluctuations.  In October 1931, Roos - who initially thought 
that he had received a crank letter - met with Cowles and Fisher to discuss Cowles' offer 
to fund econometric research.  Roos subsequently became Research Director of 
Roosevelt's National Recovery Administration, the first Director of Research at the 
Cowles Commission, and, from 1937, the head of The Econometric Institute, a private 
forecasting agency (Christ 1952, 3-17; Rima 1988, 17; Cowles 1960, 173-4).  Roos' 
(1955, 394-5) monumental Survey Article on forecasting techniques expressed enormous 
confidence in econometric techniques, it also offered the prospect of rebutting Keynes' 
proposition that investment demand was beyond the reach of forecasters. 
 
Keynesian and Marxian economics are modern versions of the 'endogenous instability of 
capitalism' thesis.  In 1929, the Dutch Statistician's Office, under Tinbergen's editorship, 
began a statistical business cycle journal. The Great Depression gave an added dimension 
to these controversies. In the 1930s, many observers were concerned about the long run 
viability of capitalism and of the apparently infeasible combination of political liberty and 
economic freedom (Desai 1981, 41).  Marschak initiated one of the earlier debates on the 
viability of socialism as an economic system, involving Pareto, Barone, von Mises, 
Schumpeter, von Hayek, Lange and Lerner.  The 1940 Cowles Commission Report stated 
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that unemployment was the primary economic problem to be tackled (Malinvaud 1988, 
191; Christ 1952, 22).  Many economists lost their faith in the ability of markets to solve 
the problem of unemployment, and many embraced the new faith of economic planning.  
Tinbergen (1984, 315), for example, retrained as an economist under the influence of the 
onset of World Depression; he regarded his econometric work, and in particular his 
estimation of parameters, as providing the tools to effect socialist intervention in the 
economy in order to minimise cyclical fluctuations and poverty (Tinbergen, in Magnus 
and Morgan 1987, 118-9; Knoester and Wellink 1993, 19).  The within-sample 
'explanatory' power of Tinbergen's equations were high; generally his R2 exceeded 0.98 
(Epstein 1987, 33, 48).   
 
Lawrence Klein shared this approach to econometrics; later he would be persecuted 
because of his socialist convictions. Harold Hotelling also favoured market socialism 
(Arrow 1990, 107).  Oscar Lange was a "proclaimed socialist", and later a member of the 
Polish Communist government (Friedman 1974a, 15).  Ragnar Frisch also had socialist 
leanings, according to Tinbergen (conversation with Arie Kapteyn, 15 November, 1994; 
Blaug 1985, 67).  Frisch came to believe that uncovering the underlying structure of the 
economy - the structural parameters - would enable the business cycle to be tamed 
(Epstein 1987, 41).  Part of this optimism may reflect the initial training in physics which 
Tinbergen, Frisch, Koopmans, and others had been exposed to (Kol and De Wolff 1993, 
29; Mirowski 1989; Tinbergen 1984, 315; Craver and Leijonhufvud 1987, 175; but see 
Andvig 1985).   
 
These ideological undercurrents were present in many of the business cycle research 
institutes which were established all over Europe and the United States in the 1920s.  The 
New School for Social Research opened in 1919, attracting refugees from Europe, and 
from Columbia University, whose President, Nicholas Butler, had pledged the University 
to stand firm against the "rule of the literary and academic Bolsheviki" (cited by Bender 
1987, 299).  In Russia in 1917, there had been a political victory for those who believed 
in the endogenous instability of capitalism thesis.  In 1920, the Konjunkture Institute of 
Moscow was founded, with Kondratieff as Director.  The controversy over business 
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cycles was more than idle speculation and involved political passions of "venomous 
ferocity" (Schumpeter 1954, 1158, n.8). In 1928 the Konjunkture Institute was closed 
down and Kondratieff was sent to Siberia and subsequently shot, whilst his long wave 
theory of the business cycle was labelled "wrong and reactionary" (Garvy 1943, 204; 
Solzhenitsyn 1973, 50; Nove 1992; Morgan 1990, 66-7).   
  
Interest in the business cycle and its control were not, of course, an exclusively socialist 
preoccupation.  In the nineteenth century, Marx used the business cycle as his 
fundamental unit of analysis; so too did W.S. Jevons (Schumpeter 1954, 742; Morgan 
1990, 16).  Marx built an endogenous instability of capitalism thesis; Jevons sought to 
locate the origins of commercial crises in exogenous forces, namely a 10.45 year sunspot 
cycle.  As late as 1923, Henry Ludwell Moore outlined a similar causal sequence 
extending back to movements in the planet Venus (Stigler 1962a, 11).  But Gottfried 
Haberler, whose League of Nations study, Prosperity and Depression led directly to 
Tinbergen's econometric work, concluded that non-economic explanations of the origins 
of the business cycle were, by the inter-war period, rare if not eccentric (1939, 9-10; but 
see Keynes 1936a, 329-332).   
 
After the war came the methodenstreit between the economic statisticians represented by 
Burns, Mitchell, Friedman and Vining at the NBER, and the econometricians, represented 
by Koopmans and the Cowles Commission.  The context, and hence the emphatic nature 
of this methodenstreit, was the quite spectacular failure of Keynesian models in the 
immediate post-war period.  After the U.S. Full Employment Bill, the Cowles 
Commission Paper No. 23 stated that this methodenstreit was between "the nonstatistical 
economist" and "The Use[rs] of Econometric Models as a Guide to Economic Policy"; 
concluding that "the latter is better equipped" (Klein 1947, 112).  Paul Samuelson (1944a, 
1944b, 1988, 63-4) predicted "Unemployment Ahead"; and even though U.S. 
unemployment in 1946 turned out to be 3 million, rather the 8 million predicted in late 
1945, the choice was now between tackling the forecasting problem "with renewed 
vigour", or discarding econometrics and "relax[ing] again into armchair comments ... the 
line of least resistance ...  We cannot be very hopeful about solving our economic 
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problems if we have to rely on such methods [of the pre-war guessers] in the future ...  
Econometric methods could not have been worse than any other methods that were used" 
(Klein 1946, 302-6).   
2.3 Tinbergen and Keynes 
In the last decade, econometrics has begun to attract the attention of increasing numbers 
of historians of thought, much of it focused on the Keynes-Tinbergen exchange.  Most 
commentators have adopted one (or sometimes two) attitudes with respect to Keynes' 
critique.  For some, it was a lamentable performance on Keynes part (Klein 1951, 450-1), 
traceable to his ill-health, technical rustiness and tactical predilections (Stone 1978, 62-
3).  For some, Keynes simply misunderstood what Tinbergen was attempting to do (Klant 
1985), or "he did not really have the necessary technical knowledge to understand what 
he was criticising" (Samuelson 1946, 197, n11).  For others, Keynes was, in a qualified 
way, more sympathetic to econometrics than had hitherto been supposed (Bateman 1990). 
 Keynes' reference to "alchemy", it has been argued, might have been intended as a 
gesture of encouragement, suggesting that Tinbergen might ultimately succeed in creating 
the foundations of an econometric science (Rima 1988, 16).  Some have even speculated 
that had he lived longer, Keynes might have become a computer-based modeller at the 
centre of a "high-tech 'circus'" (Bodkin, Klein and Marwah 1988, 9, n10, 10-11, n15).  
Alternatively, others have argued that Keynes' critique is still relevant to modern 
econometrics (Patinkin 1976; Hendry 1980).  Indeed, the co-founder of the New Classical 
anti-Keynesian counter-revolution and the author of a devastating critique of econometric 
policy evaluation (constructed with Keynesian macroeconometrics in mind) recognised 
an irony: "In referring to those who built in part on Tinbergen's work as 'Keynesian' I am, 
then, contributing to the continuation of an historical injustice" (Lucas 1977, 10, n5). 
 
Too much of the history of macroeconomics has been bedevilled by attempts to label (and 
sometimes libel) the author of the macroeconomic Old Testament.  Surprisingly, while 
there has been much discussion of the Keynes-Tinbergen debate, both at a general and at 
a specific level, there has previously been no attempt to dissect Keynes' critique into 
operational categories.  By treating the Keynes critique en bloc, we are in danger of 
concluding that his suspicions about econometrics were "invalid" (Malinvaud 1991, 636); 
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or "venial and not to be remembered" (Stone 1978, 88, last sentence); or not worthy of 
mention (Stone 1980, section III).  A disaggregated approach allows much greater light to 
be shone on those aspects of Keynes' critique which have relevance to contemporary 
econometric practices.  It also reveals that Tinbergen finally acknowledged the potency of 
parts of Keynes' critique, as Keynes predicted he would (1939, 568, last paragraph).  The 
words from Goethe's Zauberlehrling, which forms part of the title of this chapter, were 
prophetically cited by Tinbergen on the occasion of his Nobel Lecture (Tinbergen 1969, 
43; for similar sentiments see Klein 1971a, 416).   
 
Ragnar Frisch (1970, 164), Tinbergen's co-recipient of the first Nobel Prize in Economic 
Science, also bemoaned "the cascade of papers of the playometric kind"; and had long 
been sceptical about some of the directions of applied econometrics (Arrow 1960, 183).  
Tinbergen (1967, 272) criticised economists for being averse to time-consuming factual 
and statistical research which was required for quality empirical research.  Tinbergen 
(1956, 149-85) also developed parts of what became known as the Lucas Critique (Lucas 
1976, 20); and he assumed that "expectations are 'rational' i.e. are consistent with the 
economic relationships" ([1932], cited by Keuzenkamp 1991, 1247).  Half a century after 
the publication of his Econometric Approach To Business Cycle Problems, Magnus and 
Morgan (1987, 136) asked Tinbergen, "How do you feel about the way econometrics has 
developed over the last twenty years or so?  In 1952 you feared that techniques could take 
over from attention to human needs and problems in the field of economics.  Do you feel 
this fear was justified?"  Tinbergen replied: "I'm afraid, yes".  Again, a vindication of 
parts of the Keynes Critique. 
 
Keynes and Tinbergen are usually characterised as having incompatible views on 
econometrics.  Yet, Tinbergen's Nobel Lecture can be viewed as the opening volley of the 
"orgy of self-criticism" (Blaug 1980, 253) which descended on the economics profession 
when the predictive power of many of the macroeconometric models of the period were 
found to be less than impressive (Leontief 1971, 3; Worswick 1972, 79; Phelps Brown 
1972, 6).  Given that some aspects of Keynes' warnings still retain their validity 
(Samuelson 1992, 243-4; Ormerod 1994, 92-112), it is instructive to disaggregate his 
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concerns about econometrics. 
 
Keynes appreciated the qualities of "a real trained statistician", and was "in fundamental 
sympathy with the deep underlying conceptions of the statistical theory of the day".  The 
subject of his second known letter to a newspaper was the interpretation of statistics; and 
one of his earliest academic disputes was with Karl Pearson over the appropriate 
statistical methods of studying the effects of parental alcoholism on offspring; a dispute 
which illustrated "the pitfalls of statistical inference" (Harrod 1951, 154).  His final 
posthumously published article was "solely concerned with the available statistics".  One 
of the themes of his career was the analysis of "the logical basis of statistical modes of 
argument", and the search for "the principles of sound induction" which might constitute 
"a good scientific argument ...".  Keynes had planned to specialise in Logic and Statistical 
Theory, and A Treatise on Probability attempted to "cover the whole field of empirical 
thinking ... it would be difficult to find a parallel for a comprehensive attack of this kind 
since the days of Aristotle" (Harrod 1951, 126, 133-4).  The final section of his 
Fellowship Dissertation was entitled 'The Foundations of Statistical Inference', which 
concluded with an 'Outline of a Constructive Theory'.  The union of descriptive and 
inferential statistics was "the occasion of a great deal of confusion.  The statistician who 
is mainly interested in the technical methods of his science, is less concerned to discover 
the precise conditions in which a description can be legitimately extended by induction.  
He slips somewhat easily from one to the other, and having found a complete and 
satisfactory mode of description he may take less pains over the transitional argument ... 
[but] he must pay attention to a new class of considerations and must display a different 
kind of capacity ... He is faced, in fact, with the normal problems of inductive science ... 
[involving material which] will be necessarily incapable of exact, numerical, or statistical 
treatment ... Generally speaking, therefore, I think that the business of statistical 
technique ought to be strictly limited to preparing the numerical aspects of our material in 
an intelligent form, so as to be ready for the application of the usual inductive methods".  
Most of the mathematical methods applied to statistical inference were invalid, and could 
"only lead to error and to delusion" (JMK XV [1908], 12; [1909], 20-1; VIII [1921], 359-
60, 419, 427, 428, 468; XXVII [1946], 428, 430).      
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Keynes informed the Macmillan Committee that although "the empirical method is not by 
any means successful for the diagnosis [of the Depression] it is not by any means 
valueless for seeking the cure" (JMK XX [1930], 99).  He concluded Volume II of his 
Treatise on Money (1930, 408) with a plea for greater quantitative knowledge: "statistics 
are of fundamental importance to suggest theories, to test them and make them 
convincing ... [and] to eliminate impressionism".  He opened The General Theory with a 
call for a statistical examination of the relationship between changes in money wages and 
changes in real wages.  It was on statistical grounds that he asserted that the wage units 
could "only be reduced amidst the decay and dissolution of economic society" (1936a, 9-
10, 40-41, 102-4, 340, n1).  Keynes was particularly opposed to the statistical method 
underpinning the American Keynesian 'Phillips curve' trade-off (JMK XXIII [1941], 181-
93).  Chapter 6 of the unwritten Footnotes to the General Theory, was entitled 'Statistical 
notes' (JMK XIV [1936], 134).  He told Austin Robinson (1972, 535) that "all his best 
ideas came from messing around with figures and seeing what they must mean".  But 
throughout his career he opposed the use of mathematical methods in both statistics and 
economics.  When it came to questions of inference, experimental methods were often to 
be preferred to statistical methods (JMK XI [1911], 216). Certain methods of statistical 
analysis led to invalid results.  Investigations of samples, but not complete populations, 
were also suspect.  For statistics to be decisive, they had to extend over a period long 
enough to eliminate other influences (1936a, 104; JMK XIX.I [1923], 122). 
 
Keynes was suspicious of all numbers derived by formulae from non-experimental data, 
especially when the original data had been suppressed.  To "enable the reader to form 
some sort of independent judgement ... the real character of the evidence" must be 
displayed; not just the products derived from applying "mathematical machinery" (JMK 
XI [1910], 191).  Graphs were highly suitable for "publicity or propaganda purposes", as 
Florence Nightingale discovered; but Keynes warned of the "horrid examples of the evils 
of the graphical method unsupported by tables of figures.  Both for accurate 
understanding and particularly to facilitate the use of the same material by other people it 
is essential that graphs should not be published by themselves but only when supported 
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by the tables which will lead up to them. It would be an exceedingly good rule to forbid 
in any scientific periodical the publication of graphs unsupported by tables" (JMK XI 
[1938], 234). But he was unstinting in his support for the statistician Udny Yule in his 
quest for a lectureship in Cambridge (Skidelsky 1983, 222). Appropriately, Yule (1926) 
went on to produce some classic work on "nonsense correlations".  
 
In 1923, Keynes helped launch the regular London and Cambridge Economic Series 
barometric survey of business conditions, and he repeatedly campaigned for improved 
economic statistics, not to be used for regression analysis, but to offer intuitive insights 
into reality (Stone 1978, 64-72; Skidelsky 1992, 106, 414, 270; JMK XXVII [1944], 
371).  He was very supportive of James Meade, Richard Stone and the new Central 
Statistical Department, and he thought that it was "most dangerous for too wide a gap to 
develop between inside and outside statistical information" (JMK XXII [1941], 329, 
331).  His first concern was whether the data were "good enough to stand the strain which 
has been placed upon them".  The accuracy of statistics whose "sole purpose is to satisfy 
the ... troublesome and often trifling curiosity of the academic statistician" could not be 
relied upon (JMK XI [1929], 229; XV [1909], 36; XVIII [1923], 152; XXII [1939], 82); 
"The suspicion of quackery has not yet disappeared [from statistics] ... There is still about 
it for scientists a smack of astrology, of alchemy" (JMK VIII [1921], 367).  But he looked 
forward to a systematic theory of statistics and the continued quantification of economics: 
"Whether the uniformity of economic settings is sufficient to enable the economist to 
make full use of this kind of work, time will show" (JMK XI [1909], 50-51, [1929], 226). 
 The "excellently complete statistics now available in the United States" were available to 
illustrate aspects of the theory of the Trade Cycle (1936a, 332).  If Tinbergen simply 
examined "statistically particular cases, regarding them as particular cases, and no more 
... I am entirely in favour of him" (JMK XIV [1938], 302).   
 
Keynes was a leading exponent of the 1930s revolt against non-quantitative economics:  
"it was [Keynes'] natural inclination to approach any problem from the angle of 
measurement of the phenomena ... But just as he was sceptical of ideas that could not be 
verified by measurement, so  he was sceptical also of the adventures of the statisticians 
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into the world of correlations built on insufficient logical foundations" (Robinson 1947, 
44; 1992, 211).  It was one of the principals of statistical method that "elaborate 
calculations ... confuse, though they might also impress, all readers outside a very 
restricted class".  It was "the nature of valid argument which is in dispute ... Professor 
Pearson may cover up by elaboration of method ... [but] it is difficult to know how 
properly to characterise the work of a statistician who uses in controversy a table of this 
description with complete dogmatic assurance and without making plain to the reader the 
principles of its construction" (JMK XXIII [1910], 191-2, 199, 205). 
 
With respect to Tinbergen, the problem of multicollinearity between variables exposed 
econometricians to "the extraordinarily difficult and deceptive complications of 'spurious' 
correlations".  Yule's discovery "sprang a mine under the contraptions of optimistic 
statisticians ... It becomes like those puzzles for children where you write down your age, 
multiply, add this and that, subtract something else, and eventually end up with the 
number of the Beast in Revelation" (JMK XIV [1938], 309-10; see also Tinbergen 1992, 
278).  It was essential to investigate whether correlation coefficients were stable across 
sub-series.  Such was the excessive emphasis on "the mathematical complications, that 
many statistical students hazily float between from defining the correlation coefficient as 
a statistical description to employing it as a measure of the probability of a statistical 
generalisation between quantitative variations" (JMK VIII [1921], 428, 464).  The 
coefficients derived from the method of applying multiple correlations to "unanalysed 
economic material, which we know to be non-homogenous through time ... are not 
constant.  There is no reason at all why they should not be different every year ... How are 
these coefficients arrived at? ... One gets the impression that it is a process of fitting a 
linear equation through trial and error".  Thus when Tinbergen and co-workers 
econometrically 'confirmed' Keynes' (JMK II [1919]) intuition that the price elasticity of 
demand for a country's exports was -2, Keynes declined to interpret these econometric 
results as compelling: "how nice for you to have found the correct figure!" he replied to 
Tinbergen (1979, 342).             
Tinbergen believed that he had tested for the constancy of his coefficients (JMK XIV 
[1938], 286-7, 292).  Keynes, however, was absolutely correct.  Pesaran and Smith (1985, 
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144) noted the complete absence of parameter stability when they re-estimated 
Tinbergen's investment equations: "The estimated coefficients move all over the place".  
Tinbergen (1969, 43) acknowledged that he and his fellow researchers found it safer "to 
ask industrialists for their investment programs rather than rely on an econometric 
explanation"; and the econometric modelling of investment remains a notoriously 
unsuccessful areas of applied econometrics.   
 
Keynes objected to econometrics for the same reason that he criticised the 'classical' 
economists: "Progress in economics consists almost entirely in a progressive 
improvement in the choice of models.  The grave fault of the later classical school, 
exemplified in Pigou, has been to overwork a too simple or out-of-date model ... But it is 
the essence of a model that one does not fill in real values for the variable functions.  To 
do so would make it useless as a model" [emphases in text].  Economics was a method of 
thinking: "The object of our analysis is, not to provide a machine, or method of blind 
manipulation, which will furnish an infallible answer, but to provide ourselves with an 
organised and orderly method of thinking out particular problems; and, after we have 
reached a provisional conclusion by isolating the complicating factors one by one, we 
then have to go back on ourselves and allow, as well as we can, for the probable 
interactions of the factors amongst themselves.  This is the nature of economic thinking.  
Any other way of applying our formal principles of thought (without which, however, we 
shall be lost in the woods) will lead us into error" (1936a, 297; JMK XIV [1938], 296; for 
Friedman's approving echo of this Marshallian theme, see 1953, 7).   
 
Keynes was not "content with the sort of broad general impression of how things worked 
that contents so many macroeconomists" (Robinson 1972, 534).  He warned his students 
that "the stuff of economics was not sharp or precise, and it was too easy to distort it and 
create for it the impression of an exactitude that it really lacked, and by subjecting it to 
mathematical manipulation also to wind up with a seriously distorted picture of the 
economy" (Tarshis 1977, 73).  He was concerned about "the appalling state of 
scholasticism into which the minds of so many economists have got which allows them to 
take leave of their intuitions altogether.  Yet in writing economics one is not writing 
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either a mathematical proof or a legal document" (JMK XXIX [1935], 150); "The real 
tool is thought, and [equations] are not a substitute for it, but at most a guide or 
embodiment" (cited by Young 1987, 13). Almost identical concerns were echoed a 
generation later by Frisch and Koopmans. 
 
Like Friedman (1967, 88; 1974), Keynes had a corresponding nosological concern about 
the economics profession.  Keynes had "a very poor opinion of Marschak", and described 
Colin Clark as "almost the only economic statistician I have ever met who seems to me 
quite first class" (JMK XXIX, 57, n11; O'Donnell 1992, 16).  He had long-held opinions 
concerning the fruitlessness of certain statistical rather than experimental methods of 
analysis; of the impossibility of reducing human conduct to a set of equations; and of 
using "the collection of facts for the prediction of future frequencies and associations" 
(JMK VIII [1921], 368).  There was "great danger in quantitative forecasts which are 
based exclusively  on statistics relating to conditions which are by no means parallel" 
(JMK XXIII [1941], 192).   
 
He was concerned that the statisticians' occupational disease should not become the 
economists' occupation.  As he wrote to Harrod (in reference to Tinbergen's work), "I 
think it most important, for example, to investigate statistically the order of magnitude of 
the multiplier ...[but] to convert a model into a quantitative formula is to destroy its 
usefulness as an instrument of thought ... by filling in figures, which one can be quite sure 
will not apply next time, so far from increasing the value of his instrument, he has 
destroyed it".  Most of the claims derived from statistical inference, he argued, were 
inadmissible from the perspective of logic (of which economics was a branch), and were 
evidence of "mathematical charlatanry" (cited by Skidelsky 1983, 223).  Keynes, like 
Harrod, held Tinbergen in the highest regard, yet Tinbergen's econometric work, he wrote 
in a note to Richard Kahn, was "all hocus" and simply a "mess of unintelligible 
figurings".  The influences on investment were variables, and, therefore, "it is logically 
impossible to discover by Tinbergen's method the comparative dependence on profit 
lagged ... I complain that this sort of logical point is not first discussed - or even 
mentioned.  Until it is, the whole thing is charlatanism in spite of Tinbergen's admirable 
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candour" (JMK XIV [1938], 301, 304, 289, 299, 332, 305).  
In The General Theory, Keynes located one of the origins of macroeconomic instability 
in the "animal spirits" of those undertaking investment, which depended upon "the nerves 
and hysteria and even the digestion and reaction to the weather of those upon whose 
spontaneous activity it largely depends".  Crucial variables, such as the rate of interest 
and the marginal efficiency of capital "are particularly concerned with the indefinite 
character of actual expectations; they sum up the effect in men's market decisions of all 
sorts of vague doubts and fluctuating states of confidence and courage.  They belong, that 
is to say, to a stage of our theory where we are no longer assuming a definite and 
calculable future ... Our precision will be mock precision if we try to use such partly 
vague and non-quantitative concepts as the basis of a quantitative analysis".  Statistical 
comparison could be useful, "depending on some broad element of judgement rather than 
strict calculation" (1936a, 161-2, 39-40; 1937, 151).   
 
Multiple correlation analysis was "too elaborate and adds little or nothing" ([1940], cited 
by Epstein 1987, 143). This type of analysis requires that a complete set of relevant 
variables are included, and are accurately measurable (for Friedman's elaboration of this 
point, see 1953, 32; 49). There will be a "serious misrepresentation of the causal process, 
if in fact some significant factors have been omitted".  As a piece of "historical curve 
fitting and description ... it is not a very lucid way of describing the past" (1939, 566; 
Carabelli 1988, 291, n10).  To derive inductive generalisations from statistical 
descriptions is a hazardous operation which requires that environmental conditions 
remain homogenous and uniform in future time periods (JMK VIII [1921], 359-470).  
The material to which economic models are applied is, "in too many respects, not 
homogenous through time" (JMK XIV [1938], 296; for similar sentiments, see Alfred 
Marshall, approvingly cited by Friedman 1953 [1949], 90).  This implies that 
econometrics is inappropriate in cases when "political, social and physiological factors, 
including such things as government policy, the progress of invention, and the state of 
expectations may be significant. In particular, it is inapplicable to the problems of the 
Business Cycle" (1939, 561). In a letter to Gerald Shove, Keynes wrote that "as soon as 
one is dealing with the influence of expectations and of transitory experience, one is, in 
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the nature of things outside of the realm of the formally exact".  Keynes concluded that 
"one feels a suspicion that the choice of factors is influenced (as is indeed only natural) 
by what statistics are available, and that many vital factors are ignored because they are 
statistically intractable or unprocurable".  On a visit to the United States, he cautioned 
younger economists such as Gilbert, Humphrey and Salant, against neglecting important 
theoretical considerations "in the interests of simplifying their statistical task" (JMK XIV 
[1936], 2; [1938], 287; XXIII [1941], 192).   
 
Prophetically, as Friedman (1991, 36) pointed out, Keynes (1939, 568, 559) predicted 
that econometrics had acquired a momentum of its own that would tend to make its 
practitioners resistant to criticism.  Tinbergen will probably "engage another ten 
computers and drown his sorrows in arithmetic ... The worst of him is that he is much 
more interested in getting on with the job than in spending time in deciding whether the 
job is worth getting on with.  He so clearly prefers the mazes of arithmetic to the mazes 
of logic".   Keynes was clearly not opposed to statistical analysis, but "he hated stupidity, 
not only with aesthetic but also with a moral hatred: stupidity prevented the 
accomplishment of what was best for the world" (Robinson 1947, 29).  He was primarily 
concerned that mechanical econometric practices might become a tangled web for the 
economics profession.  He conducted a "ferocious campaign to discredit the activities of 
Tinbergen and later Kalecki ... Keynes' opposition to [multiple correlation analysis] was 
extraordinarily unyielding" (Epstein 1987, 142-3).  Skidelsky (1992, 618) reported that 
"Keynes attacked Tinbergen's efforts with an astonishingly fierce barrage of arguments".  
According to Pesaran and Smith (1985, 147) "It was the unjustifiable inductive 
pretensions that provoked his venom".  Keynes also referred, perhaps mockingly, to 
"nefarious econometrics" (Stone 1978, 63), and in 1946 he told Jacob Viner (1964, 265) 
that he "disowned any responsibility for their [his disciples] reliance on restricted and 
mechanical manipulations of a few statistical series, rather than making a broad survey of 
the significant factors and using judgement in assaying their importance and the nature of 
their impacts". 
 
W.C. Mitchell provided the momentum that led to the establishment of the Oxford 
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Institute of Statistics (Young and Lee 1993, 119-20; Harrod 1949).  Keynes was 
determined to establish a Cambridge department of what he called "statistical realistic 
economics" in opposition to Tinbergen's macroeconometrics, and as a rival, perhaps, to 
the Oxford Institute of Statistics, which had appointed Marschak (who had fled both 
Lenin and Hitler) as Director, and where Klein would seek refuge during the McCarthyite 
period.  Keynes favoured the use of balance sheets and survey data (which elicited 
preferences) in the investigation of quantitative policy issues (Epstein 1987, 142-3).  
Richard Stone (1978, 83-7) became the first Director of the Cambridge Department of 
Applied Economics in April 1946, the month of Keynes' death.  In one sense, Stone and 
his co-workers acknowledged Keynes' critique by focusing their research efforts on the 
econometric analysis of modern demand theory, which is widely regarded as an 
econometric success story, in contrast to the rather disappointing performance of the large 
macroeconometric models (Gilbert 1991). 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for Keynes, was the question of the likelihood of 
self-deception, and of the integrity and biases of the econometrician - "the spirit with 
which the subject is tackled", as Hendry (1980, 403) called it.  Richard Feynman argued 
that the first principal of scientific integrity is that "you must not fool yourself, and you 
are the easiest person to fool" (cited by Warsh 1988, 251).  For Keynes, "the more 
complicated and technical the preliminary statistical investigations become, the more 
prone inquirers are to mistake the statistical description for an inductive generalisation".  
In particular, ad hoc specifications of time-lags introduces the possibility that the 
econometrician will fidget "about until he finds a time-lag which does not fit in too badly 
with the theory he is testing".  With respect to the assumption of linearity, Keynes warned 
that "it would certainly seem that quite easy manipulation on these lines would make it 
possible to fit any explanation to any facts" (JMK VIII [1921], 361; 1939, 565, 563-4; 
1940, 155; Klein 1992, 184).  
 
With respect to Tinbergen: "There is no-one, therefore, so far as human qualities go, 
whom it would be safer to trust with black magic. That there is anyone I would trust with 
it at the present stage or that this brand of statistical alchemy is ripe to become a branch 
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of science, I am not yet persuaded".  It might be fruitful to use these methods to 
investigate more elementary cases, such as the estimation of the various influences on the 
net investment in railway rolling-stock (JMK XIV [1940], 320; [1938], 287-9, 295, 317). 
 Keynes (1938a) spoke highly of forecasts derived from statistical analysis - when applied 
to cases such as the international corn trade.  But regression analysis could not 
legitimately be applied to macroeconomic problems such as the "problem of imports as a 
whole" ([1939], cited by Carabelli 1988, 291, n10). 
 
2.4 Friedman and Keynes 
2.4.1 Econometric Disputation  
Keynes (1936a, 33, vii-viii) and Friedman (1953, 30) are both associated with the idea 
that predictive failure is damaging to scientific status; both doubted the existence of 
"conclusive" tests or evidence in economics.  Both perceived themselves to be heirs to an 
"oral tradition" in monetary theory (JMK XI [1911], 375; Friedman 1956; Patinkin 1969; 
Leeson 1998; Leeson forthcoming).  But methodologically, The General Theory is a tract 
on the importance of examining the realism and relevance of assumptions (see, for 
example, 1936a, 276); and Milton Friedman (correspondence, April 18, 1995) has 
confirmed that his own methodology of positive economics was constructed in opposition 
to this tendency.    
 
When it came to the "scientific problems" associated with data analysis, for over half a 
century Friedman (1957, ix) has elaborated and echoed many of the themes discussed by 
Keynes. In his seven page Centenary article for the Economic Journal (1991, 36-8), 
entitled appropriately "Old Wine in New Bottles," Friedman humorously refers to some 
of his own regressions as a "clear case of GIGO" (Garbage In, Garbage Out); but on a 
more serious note he concluded that the capacity to put data through the computer-based 
"econometric wringer" has "induced economists to carry reliance on mathematics and 
econometrics beyond the point of vanishing returns. I generate multiple regressions these 
days at a rate that I never would have contemplated three or four decades ago - and many 
more than I would have if I followed my own prescription for proper research 
procedures".  
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Friedman (1991, 36-8) also displayed an appreciation of the way in which "the Keynesian 
revolution changed the language and tools with which economists analysed the aggregate 
economy".  He noted that the structure of professional incentives - "the tendency to count 
rather than to evaluate publications" - had created an inbuilt bias toward generating low 
quality econometric research, derived from data mining: "there is wide agreement that 
GIGO ... is a real problem".  His training as a statistician had made him acutely aware 
that all statisticians "like to use our fancy techniques to see what the data show" (1963a, 
8).  
 
These themes occur throughout his career. His famous and influential methodology of 
positive economics (1953 [1947], 301-319; 1953, 3-43), had been formulated in the 
context of some highly misleading Keynesian macroeconometric forecasts: "errors in 
forecasting may have nothing to do with the validity of many of the underlying theories... 
these [other] more accurate predictions do not prove that their methods are superior to 
those that failed" (Klein 1946, 289).  For Friedman, in contrast, the chief obstacle to the 
attainment of positive status was the difficulty of testing the validity of tentative 
hypotheses.  Economic data were difficult to interpret: "this hindered greatly the 
permanent weeding out of unsuccessful hypotheses.  They are always cropping up again". 
 This led to an emphasis on the realism of assumptions, "the battle cry of institutionalists 
and the closely related emphasis on extensive statistical studies of economic phenomena 
which constituted an easier test of hypotheses ...  Alfred Marshall's emphasis on the 
construction of an 'engine for the discovery of concrete truth' has tended to be submerged 
under the urge for descriptive realism".  Friedman approved of the Marshallian method 
used by Keynes to explore the theory of employment; but disapproved of the Walrasian 
method employed by some Keynesians  (1952, 456-7; 1953 [1949], 56-7, 92). However, 
from the mid-1930s, the formalist general equilibrium revolution began to supplant the 
Marshallian 'engineers'. Marshall's ambiguities, it was claimed, had "paralysed the best 
brains in the Anglo Saxon branch of our profession for three decades" (Samuelson 1967a, 
109). 
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Lucas and Sargent (1978, 50) noted that the "Keynesian revolution was, in the form in 
which it succeeded in the United States, a revolution in method" [emphasis in text].  
Friedman (1953 [1944], 277-300) led the "Methodological Criticism" of Oscar Lange's 
1944 Cowles Monograph, Price Flexibility and Employment.  An economist, he argued, 
who is concerned about economic reality "is not likely to stay within the bounds of a 
method of analysis that denies him the knowledge he seeks.  He will escape the shackles 
of formalism, even if he has to resort to illogical devices and specious reasoning to do 
so".  For almost a decade, Frank Knight and Friedman led the "fairly intense struggle" 
against the Cowles Commission at Chicago (Reder 1982, 10).  As part of his critique of 
the Cowles Commission approach to econometrics, Friedman (1951, 107) noted that "we 
have fallen into the habit of not trying to test the validity of many hypotheses even when 
we can do so ...  After all most experiments are destined to be unsuccessful; the tragic 
thing is that in economics we so seldom find out that they are".   
 
Friedman took over much of the Keynes Critique and made it his own.  Yet the 
evaluation of econometric evidence became the 'space-time' arena of the disputes 
between Keynesians and monetarists - who began to resemble electrons with opposite 
spin, in the same orbit. Paradigmatic challengers have to fight on grounds chosen by the 
dominant orthodoxy.  Both sides confidently concluded that the evidence supported their 
a prioris, and was "so strikingly one-sided" (Friedman 1963a, 8; Stein 1982, 209; Desai 
1981, 203).  On the Keynesian side in particular, there was a belief that precision 
econometric modelling would eliminate the "ambiguous use of language - [the] 
Marshallian legacy shamelessly indulged in by all sides" (Desai 1981, 64).  This episode 
of intellectual history revealed that econometrics was not powerful enough to 
unambiguously discriminate between alternative weltanschauungs. 
 
There is a paradox here.  Keynesian macroeconometrics, at least initially, retained a faith 
in structural estimation as a tool for discriminating between the 'true' and the 'false' 
model, and also for effecting the type of government policies which would mitigate, if not 
eliminate, the business cycle.  The losing side (in terms of policy-influence from the mid-
1970s) suffered a double defeat.  The winning side scored a double victory: monetary 
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targeting (based, in part, on the results derived from monetarist macroeconometrics) 
temporarily replaced Phillips curve targeting; Friedman's (and Keynes') suspicions about 
macroeconometrics also appeared to have been partly vindicated. 
Harry Johnson, in his remarkable Richard T. Ely Lecture on 'The Keynesian Revolution 
and the Monetarist Counter - Revolution', wrote that one of the reasons for the success of 
the Keynesian revolution was that "The General Theory offered an important empirical 
relationship for the emerging tribe of econometricians to measure". Likewise, monetarism 
advanced "a new and important empirical relationship, suitable for determined estimation 
by the budding econometrician.  That relationship was found in the demand function for 
money". The methodology of positive economics "offered liberation to the small-scale 
intellectual, since it freed his mind from dependence on the large-scale research teams 
and the large and expensive computer program".  The monetarist counter-revolution 
would "peter out" because "monetarism is seriously inadequate as an approach to 
monetary theory"; with its "abnegation of responsibility for explaining the division of the 
effects of monetary changes between price and quantity movements ... one should not be 
too fastidious in condemnation of the techniques of scholarly chicanery to promote a 
revolution or a counter-revolution in economic theory" (Johnson and Johnson 1978 
[1971], 189, 196-8). 
 
Milton Friedman (correspondence April 18, 1995) recalls that "Harry Johnson was an 
extremely subtle and sophisticated person ...  Harry was originally a very strong 
Keynesian who was converted to monetarism.  He remained something of a Keynesian 
whenever he was in Chicago and was a strong monetarist whenever he was in London".  
Johnson was clearly fuelled by a variety of motives and inputs; and jealousy of his 
Chicago colleague may have been one of them.  But Friedman's genius (like Keynes') 
extends to an understanding of the sociology of knowledge in the economics profession 
(see, for example, 1955a, 902).   
 
Keynes (1936a, 21, 81) highlighted the power of the "optical illusion" of Say's Law.  In 
his defence of Mitchell, Friedman (1950, 470, 467) drew the contrast between Mitchell's 
work and "the shoddy work that passes for scientific".  He also bemoaned the ability of 
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the Cowles Commission econometricians to successfully cultivate the "illusion that 
Mitchell was antitheoretical".  He noted that "worthless" Keynesian national income 
models, which misrepresented the underlying macroeconomic structure, could 
nevertheless become hegemonic on the back of a "Statistical Illusion"- when 
accompanied by an analytical system which "once mastered, appeared highly mechanical 
and capable of yielding far-reaching and important conclusions with a minimum of input" 
(Friedman and Becker 1957, 68, 73; Friedman 1970, 207, n6).  His early sophisticated 
theoretical work on stabilisation policy (1948a; 1953 [1951], 117-132) had not noticeably 
undermined Keynesian confidence; nor had it stimulated much further research (see, for 
example, Neff 1949a,b); despite his assertion that "the question is empirical" (1949, 954). 
 The Cowles-NBER methodological dispute had produced only "desultory skirmishing" 
(1951, 114).  His theoretical work left him feeling "as if I were preaching in the 
wilderness and belaboring the obvious".  Even "distressingly obvious" conclusions could 
be "widely neglected" (1953 [1951], 131; for almost identical words, see Keynes 1936a, 
viii).  Likewise, his plea for a Marshallian redirection of economics - Walras' "divorce of 
form from substance" had led to some "nonsense" - failed to be persuasive (1955a, 980-9; 
for almost identical words, see Keynes, cited by Skidelsky 1992, 615).  Friedman (1955b, 
402) found it "fantastic" that his empirical estimates of the effect of unions on the wage 
structure should lead to only a rather unproductive theoretical rebuttal: "I guess the farther 
grass looked greener to both of us". 
 
A Theory of the Consumption Function (1957) - which was labelled, in part, "The 
Friedman Effect" - was perceived to have contributed towards putting "trade cycle theory 
on what one might call 'a fully expectational footing'" (Farrell 1959, sections VII-VIII, 
694).  It also appears to occupy a transitional position with respect to Friedman's ability to 
engage his opponents in a statistical dispute.  In his assault on one of Keynes' (1936a, 95) 
central propositions regarding the stability of the consumption function, Friedman (1957, 
86, 231) argued that Keynesians such as Lawrence Klein had presented, as supporting 
evidence, regression results "revealing a high degree of sophistication and ingenuity in 
statistical techniques and economic analysis", that were, nonetheless, "almost worthless ... 
an illusion attributable to the method of analysis ... The consumption analyst as it were, 
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has been priding himself on his success in adding yet more epicycles".   
 
Friedman's (1957, ix) book is notable also for the "almost complete absence of statistical 
tests of significance"; but is widely regarded as "one of the masterpieces of modern 
econometrics" (Blaug 1985, 63).  It also provoked an intense statistical exchange between 
Hendrik Houthakker (1958a, 1958b) and Robert Eisner (1958a) - who simultaneously 
(Eisner 1958b) was defending Harrod-Domar-Hicks growth models against the "Neo-
Classical Resurgence", which was led by Tobin and Solow.  Friedman (1958a, 991) 
thought he had been addressing the "statistically sophisticated reader".  Houthakker, 
somewhat on the back foot, thought that "Friedman had strained the statistical 
sophistication of his readers to the limit".  Part of the debate centred around "alleged 
correlation[s]", and Houthakker (1958b, 991, 993) concluded by stating that "the process 
of testing the hypothesis has only just begun".   
 
Houthakker's article was "the first full frontal statistical assault on my work" 
(correspondence from Friedman, April 18, 1995).  Friedman, and a growing body of 
associates and students, were venturing "into almost virgin territory" which they expected 
would "provoke controversy ...  What the calculations of our critics do is to establish a 
presumption that further research along similar lines may be more rewarding than we 
thought was likely" (Friedman and Meiselman 1965, 753, 784).  What followed was the 
contest between the radio stations, FM versus AM (Ando and Modigliano).  Friedman 
had found in econometric disputation, the soft underbelly of the Keynesian system. 
 
Schumpeter (1946, 196) wrote, in a now almost forgotten article on 'Keynes and 
Statistics', that "Throwing discretion to the wind, they [the orthodox Keynesians] have 
attempted to rush trenches that are stronger than they looked to them.  Econometricians 
behaved like the inexperienced armies of 1914-18, and with exactly analogous results ...  
Keynes did not order these attacks".  It seems that those who neglect the study of history 
may be condemned to repeat it; the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. 
 
2.4.2 The Friedman Critique of Econometrics  
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Monetarism was projected, and interpreted, as a belief in the existence of a stable, 
empirically identifiable  relationship between the rate of growth of the stock of money 
and the corresponding rate of inflation.  However, although he is happy to describe 
himself as "an empiricist", a perennial theme of Friedman's writings is a suspicion about 
the reliability of empirical results.  It was the "impact of experience" of inflation which 
led to the "rediscovery of money", not the "serried masses of statistics massaged through 
modern computers".  What Koopmans in the 1940s called the "Friedman critique", 
involved in part, an 'assault on structure', and in part was concerned to pour cold water on 
the post-war enthusiasm about the possibility of deriving causal relations from data.  The 
"exaggerated claims" of "scientific magic" could not disguise the fact that "every 
attempt... to forecast economic activity has to date met with failure".  In particular, it was 
"a pure act of faith to assert that [Klein's] econometric model can predict the effect of 
policy changes, and there is no reason to share this faith until some evidence for it is 
presented" (Friedman 1981, 30; 1975a, 176; 1948b, 140-1; 1951, 111).  Robert Lucas 
(1976, 20) also found in Friedman's A Theory of the Consumption Function a forerunner 
of his critique of econometric policy evaluation. 
 
A few citations from Friedman will illustrate this theme: "Tinbergen's results are simple 
tautological reformulations of selected economic data ... The methods used by Tinbergen 
do not and cannot provide an empirically tested explanation of business cycle 
movements.  As W.C. Mitchell put it some years ago 'a competent statistician with 
sufficient clerical assistance and time at his command, can take almost any pair of time 
series for a given period and work them into a form which will yield coefficients of 
correlation exceeding ±.9'" [emphasis in text] (1940, 659). High t statistics and 
correlation coefficients are "a test primarily of the skill and patience of the analyst" 
(1951, 108).  Statistical evidence could be "extremely misleading" (1962, 170), and was 
only available to confirm "general reasoning" and to offer a guide to what is "reasonable" 
(1953 [1951], 231; 1953 [1947], 312, n8); "In view of the record of forecasters, it hardly 
needs to be argued that it would be better to shun forecasting and rely instead on as 
prompt an evaluation of the current situation as possible" (1948a, 253).  
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The opening words of A Monetary History were from Alfred Marshall: "Experience in 
controversies such as these brings out the impossibility of learning anything from facts 
till they are examined and interpreted by reason; and teaches that the most reckless and 
treacherous of all theorists is he who professes to let facts and figures speak for 
themselves, who keeps in the background the part he has played, perhaps unconsciously, 
in selecting and grouping them, and in suggesting the argument post hoc ergo propter hoc 
"(1963);" ... facts by themselves are silent ... The economist must be suspicious of any 
direct light that the past is said to throw on the problems of the present.  He must stand 
fast by the more laborious plan of interrogating facts"  (Marshall, cited by Friedman 1953 
[1949], 90; 1950, 465; 1957, ix).  The interpretation of evidence "cast up by experience, 
as opposed to controlled experiments, generally requires subtle analysis and involved 
chains of reasoning, which seldom carry real conviction" (1953, 10-11). 
 
Friedman's (1957, 149-50; 1991, 36) emphasis on spurious correlation, and on the 
corresponding suspicion regarding statistics such as a high R2, echoed Keynes' (1939, 
561) sentiments and also foreshadowed later work by Tobin (1970), Granger and 
Newbold (1974) and Cooley and LeRoy (1981).  It is consistent with Hendry's (1980) 
demonstration that cumulative rainfall outperforms the money stock in price equations, 
with R2 approaching unity.  Indeed, the problem of "nonsense correlations" was 
commonly acknowledged in the inter-war period (Yule 1926); and Friedman was 
expressing a widely-held view. The implication of Friedman's cynicism is that the 'shoot 
out at high noon' approach of the econometrics movement could only end inconclusively, 
at least at the level of conventional statistical criteria.  (As it turned out this was highly 
accurate as a prediction of the forthcoming bouts between monetarists and Keynesians).  
The 'winner' would have to emerge on grounds other than those of conventional levels of 
statistical significance.  Yet Friedman and Meiselman (1963, 166) were interpreted as 
having taken their stand in favour of the monetarist macroeconomic model on the 
grounds of superior econometric performance, as measured by the size of the correlation 
coefficient.  Rather late in the day, econometricians came to realise "the futility of the R2 
game" (Poole and Kornblith 1973, 916; Brainard and Cooper 1975, 169-70; Samuelson 
1973, 389); that is, the validity of parts of Friedman's critique of econometrics.  A quarter 
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of a century too late, Friedman's major empirical adversary recognised that with respect to 
the FM-AM dispute: "I must acknowledge that the difference in parameters is partly the 
result of prior belief or ideology ... There is obviously an ideological bias in assessing the 
value of parameters ... we end up with somewhat different estimates of the same thing" 
(Modigliani 1989, 578).  
 
There were "sharp differences of judgement" between members of the Cowles 
Commission (during its sojourn at Chicago) and economists at the University of Chicago 
(Hildreth 1986, 5).  In 1946-8, Friedman was a frequent participator at the Cowles 
Commission seminars.  His relentless criticism prompted Koopmans to ask "But what if 
the investigator is honest?" (cited by Epstein 1987, 107).  Friedman predicted that the 
Cowles Commission macroeconometric models would be revealed to be unsuccessful: 
"the construction of a model for the economy as a whole is bound to be almost a complete 
groping in the dark.  The probability that such a process will yield a meaningful result 
seems to be almost negligible".  Structural estimation was a "blind alley for empirical 
research"; "Despairing of their abilities to reach quantitative answers by a direct analysis 
of these complex interrelationships, most investigators have sought refuge in empiricism 
and have based their estimations on historical relationships that have appeared fairly 
stable".  Like Keynes, he argued that prejudices or the "psychological needs of particular 
investigators" would tend to predetermine the outcome; "the background of the scientist 
is not irrelevant to the judgements they reach".  Friedman drew an analogy with 
Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle and "the interaction between the observer and the 
process observed that is so prominent a feature of the social sciences ... both have a 
counterpart in pure logic in Godel's theorem, asserting the impossibility of a 
comprehensive self-contained logic" (1943, 114; 1951, 113; 1953, 12, n11, 30, 5, n3). 
 
In his contribution to The Lives of the Laureates, Friedman concluded that "I've been very 
sceptical of the economic forecasts that people like myself and others make by using 
multiple regression analysis" (1988a, 88); "I have long been sceptical of placing major 
emphasis on purely statistical tests, whether t-values, Durbin-Watson statistics, or any 
others.  They are no doubt useful in guiding research, but they cannot be the major basis 
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for judging the economic significance or reliability of the results and cannot be a 
substitute for a thorough examination of the quality of the data used" (1988b, 232, n11); 
"low standard errors of estimates, high t-values and the like are often attributes to the 
ingenuity and tenacity of the statistician rather than reliable evidence of the ability of the 
regression to predict data not used in constructing it ... In the course of decades [my] 
scepticism has been justified time and time again" (Friedman and Schwartz, 1991, 49).  
These judgements were not particularly original to Friedman; it would be equally 
appropriate to describe them as an elaboration of the Keynes Critique, or, indeed, as part 
of the Keynes-Tinbergen-Friedman-Phillips Critique. 
 
2.4.3 The Keynes-Friedman Critique  
Keynes noted that "the inductive verification of the adherents of the [quantity] theory 
have been, I think, nearly as fallacious as those of its opponents".  Tinbergen's inclusion 
of a trend term was close to being "a method for correcting imperfect results and 
obscuring the fact that the explanation given is the wrong one".  Superimposed on all of 
these problems is the "frightful inadequacy of most of the statistics employed".  Keynes 
also highlighted what would later be called the model selection problem (JMK XII 
[1912], 765; 1939, 567; JMK XIV [1938], 287; 1940, 155-6). Statistical tests can neither 
prove a theory to be correct not incorrect, since the latter requires that the proponents of 
the theory accept that all the auxiliary conditions of the test are neutral with respect to the 
refutation.  The "fiction" that econometricians can test the relationships provided by 
economic theory is retained only for the consumption of undergraduates (Pesaran and 
Smith 1985, 145, 148, 139). 
 
According to Roy Weintraub (1983, 18), in the 1930s there were two 'centres' of formalist 
work in the United States: the Cowles Commission and Paul Samuelson (later joined by 
Robert Solow).  Samuelson (1976a, 25) observed that "By 1935 economics entered into a 
mathematical epoch.  It became easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than 
for a non-mathematical genius to enter into the pantheon of original theorist.  A kind of 
Gresham's Law operated as those of us who benefited from it know only too well".  
Keynes - with his "tremendous capacity for mastery of detail" (Robinson 1972, 534) - was 
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concerned, in this context, that economists might "lose sight of the complexities and 
interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful symbols".  He 
cautioned against the "pitfalls of a pseudo-mathematic method" (1936a, 298, 305, 275); 
he warned Sidney Alexander "against the insidious disease of mathematics" (Samuelson 
1977, 73); and he wrote mockingly about "those who feel a special confidence in a 
proposition which is expressed algebraically" (JMK XI [1911], 380-1).  Samuelson 
(1946, 197) traced this animosity back to A Treatise on Probability.  Economists were 
already too prone to "specious precision" (Keynes cited by Skidelsky 1992, 540).  
Attempts to turn economics into a "pseudo-natural science" would be counter-productive 
with respect to the training of economists: "the pseudo-analogy with the physical sciences 
leads directly counter to the habit of much which is most important for an economist 
proper to acquire".  In his obituary of Marshall, Keynes (1924) emphasised that "the 
master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts.  He must reach a high 
standard in several different directions and must combine talents not often found together. 
 He must be a mathematician, historian, statesman, and philosopher - in some degree.  He 
must understand symbols and speak in words".   W. S. Jevons brooded over his charts "to 
discover their secrets.  It is remarkable, looking back, how few followers and imitators he 
had in the black arts of inductive economics in the fifty years after 1862.  But today he 
can certainly claim an unnumbered progeny, though the scientific flair which can safely 
read the shifting sands of economic statistics is no more common than it was".   
 
This was the essence of Keynes' concern about the practices and habits likely to be 
acquired through the mechanical practice of econometrics: "The question to be answered, 
however, is whether the complicated method ... employed [by Tinbergen] does not result 
in a false precision beyond what either the method or the statistics actually available can 
support.  It may be that a more rough and ready method which preserves the original data 
in a more recognisable form may be safer"; "The truth is that sensible investigators only 
employ the correlation coefficient to test or confirm conclusions at which they have 
arrived on other grounds.  But that does not validate the crude way in which the argument 
is sometimes presented, or prevent it from misleading the wary,  - since not all 
investigators are sensible" (1924, 321; 1936b, 524; JMK XIV [1938], 296-7, 300; [1939], 
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289; JMK VIII [1921], 466).  Thus, mechanical econometric procedures, Keynes thought, 
would "displace insight and intuition and confine the scope of economics" (Pesaran and 
Smith 1985, 146).  Unlike intuition they could not offer a privileged description of 
economic reality (Keynes [1924] cited by Robinson 1972, 536; Keynes [1942] cited by 
Dyson 1979, 56-57). 
 
Like Keynes, Friedman highlighted the objections to the Cowles Commission  approach, 
based on "the choice of 'model' in their terminology ...  the choice of a 'structure' ... [and] 
the so-called 'identification' problem".  Like Keynes (JMK XIV [1938] 287), he also 
discussed "trial and error" specifications searches and how they invalidate classical 
statistical inference procedures: "Tinbergen's results cannot be judged by ordinary tests of 
statistical significance .... [his variables] have been selected after an extensive process of 
trial and error because [emphasis in text] they yield high coefficients of correlation".  
Like Keynes, he objected to the use of trend terms, which were "highly questionable on 
statistical grounds".  Like Keynes, he demonstrated that Tinbergen's coefficients were 
highly specific to the data that had been examined, and did not agree with other data.  
Like Keynes, he was alarmed by the "excessively crude" data.  Like Keynes, he 
questioned the validity of drawing meaningful interpretations from Tinbergen's results: 
"The methods used by Tinbergen do not and cannot provide an empirically tested 
explanation of business cycle movements".  Like Keynes, he cautioned against economic 
theory becoming a species of "disguised mathematics ... a retreat into purely formal or 
tautological analysis" (1940, 659-60; 1953, 11-12, n11; 1953 [1949], 77-8, n37; 1991).   
 
2.4.4 The Market for Influence  
The third perennial theme of Friedman's writing (in addition to confidence about 
monetarism and doubts about econometrics) is the Smithian case for competition as an 
irresistible force undermining the market power of producer groups (Friedman and 
Kuznets 1945; Friedman 1962b).  Large scale structural macroeconometric modelling 
was erecting (for non-Keynesians) a considerable barrier to entry into the policy market-
place (Walters 1977, 834; Friedman cited by Frazer 1988, 707). Friedman had been 
preoccupied with monumental scholarly work; but from the mid-1950s, he began to 
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address a wider audience (see, for example, Friedman 1962b, his Newsweek column, his 
appearances before Congressional committees; plus his association with U.S. Presidential 
candidate Barry Goldwater).  As if to demonstrate the "fertility of the market" and the 
"generally unstable" and "brief" (1962b, 158, 131) nature of these barriers to entry and 
other anti-competitive forces, he began to engage at this time in intense competition with 
Keynesian macroeconometrics: "we were then trying to meet an argument on its own 
ground.  I would never have been comfortable with the conclusions reached if the only 
basis for them had been the statistical correlations we were presenting.  However, by 
1963 the bulk of the Monetary History book had been written.  I felt very confident in the 
evidence from history independently of the evidence from the statistical correlations, and 
hence regarded these as confirmatory rather than decisive evidence" (correspondence 
from Friedman, 2 November, 1993).   
Friedman is widely regarded as the most persuasive debater in the economics profession 
(Blaug 1985, 62; Stigler, cited by Rose Friedman 1977, 26; Galbraith 1987, 271).  This 
stems, in part, from his conviction that "You cannot be sure that you are right unless you 
understand the arguments against your views better than your opponents do" (1974, 16).  
His initial lack of influence has been attributed to "his early habit of extreme 
aggressiveness in debate" (Breit and Ransom 1971, 256, n57).  Indeed, in an article 
entitled "Libertarians at Bay", Lincoln Gordon (1949, 976-8) from Harvard University, 
argued that "There has emerged in recent years a new fashion of egregious rudeness 
among self-styled libertarians ... the Hayek-Mises-Jewkes-Graham manner ...  One can 
hardly escape the conclusion that Mr Graham's swimming suffers from a failure to 
understand which way is down".  But later, when the Keynesian tide turned, it was those 
who were losing policy-influence who displayed a "bitterness beyond reason" 
(McCloskey 1986, 184).  A fair-minded observer noted that "modern econometricians 
may well look askance at some of [Friedman's and Schwartz's] econometric 
methodology" (Goodhart 1982, 1542).  But the primary structural failure was not 
Friedman's lapse from best-practice structural estimation, but the failure of the 
econometrics fraternity to develop a suitably trained historical sub-discipline. 
2.5 Phillips and Phillips Curve Econometrics: 
Fresh Textual Evidence from "The One and Only True and Complete Set of the 
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Bones of The Saints" 
Jacob Marschak had been Minister of Labor in the short-lived Menshevik government of 
the Terek Republic in the North Caucasus.  He had an early encounter with perspicacious 
forecasts when a colleague warned him that this paedocracy (a government of children) 
would fall "when the corn has grown high enough to conceal a man on horseback" 
(Koopmans 1978, xii).  He became Director (1943-48) of the Cowles Commission at 
Chicago, initially believing that structural estimation possessed a unique epistemological 
status: it was "the Gospel ... I hope we can become 'social engineers'" (cited by Epstein 
1987, 69, 61, 67; Hildreth, 1986, 3-8; Malinvaud 1988, 194; Klein 1978, 326, Arrow, 
1978).  Frisch's description of the first European meeting of the Econometric Society at 
Lausanne in 1931 captured this heady enthusiasm.  Klein (1947, 111) believed that 
econometric models "eventually should lead all investigators to the same conclusion"; 
Tinbergen believed that "differences of opinion can, in principle, be localised" (1937, 73; 
Samuelson 1992, 243).   
 
At the risk of oversimplification we can describe the 'econometrics movement' as an 
attempt to locate The General Theory of Macroeconomic Structure; the quest for a "single 
'final' equation" (Schumpeter 1954, 1168, n20), or series of equations, with reliable 
estimated coefficients; a form of econometric fundamentalism. Combined with this 
pioneering confidence was a willingness to directly confront as many theoretical 
problems as their critics could muster; plus a deep understanding of the unsatisfactory 
nature of economic data.  This sense of integrity gradually eroded such pioneering 
confidence, and contributed to the 'retreat from structure'.  In many ways, it was Klein 
(1992, 184) who symbolised the ongoing faith in large scale macroeconometric models, 
in opposition to the principle of parsimony. 
 
The third 'wave' of macroeconometric enthusiasm - primarily associated with the 
construction of Keynesian Phillips curves - was the 'wave' most damaging to the prestige 
and scientific credibility of the economics profession.  The opposition to the first 'wave' 
of macroeconometric enthusiasm (associated with Tinbergen's work in the 1930s) was led 
primarily by Keynes.  The opposition to the second 'wave' (associated with the Cowles 
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Commission) was led by Friedman.  This enthusiasm did not survive what Koopmans 
called the "Friedman critique" (Epstein 1987, 111).  Disappointing empirical results led 
to the 'retreat from structure' after 1947.  Yet large scale Keynesian macroeconometric 
models continued, often with ad hoc monetary sectors, and following Klein and 
Goldberger (1955, 1), an ongoing "constant adjustment".  Keynesian 
macroeconometricians abandoned their optimism concerning the revealing nature of 
structural estimation, and had come to rest, in part, on the judgement of the researcher 
(Tinbergen 1969, 44; Zarnowitz 1968, 427; Klein 1971b, 48; Hildreth 1986, 60; see 
Desai 1981, 154 for the 'endogenise a bit more' approach to the pursuit of structure).  The 
Keynesian Phillips curve macroeconometric models which collapsed in the 1970s were, 
together with their underlying method of research, effectively orphaned thrice: disowned 
by Keynes, abandoned by most of the Cowles Commission workers, and antithetical to 
both the spirit and the detail of Phillips' work. 
 
Nevertheless, the third 'wave' of econometric optimism occurred simultaneously with the 
increased availability of computing power in the 1960s.  Phillips was one of the most 
insightful critics of the Keynesian Phillips curve estimation industry.  Like H.L. Moore 
(Stigler 1962a), Phillips avoided controversy, but it is clear that in many important 
respects his work does not belong in the same category as most of the macroeconometric 
exercises of the 1960s.  First, he pioneered the role of inflationary expectations in this 
type of macroeconomics.  Secondly, many of these models did not adequately deal with 
money; but Phillips' model and his famous Machine were based on monetary dynamics.  
Thirdly, Phillips was opposed to the idea of trading-off higher rates of inflation for 
supposed benefits with respect to unemployment.  Fourthly, a decade before Clower and 
Leijonhufvud, Phillips was teaching Keynesian macroeconomics as a disequilibrium 
phenomenon (Lipsey 1981, 547).  Phillips' dynamic stabilisation exercise was concerned 
to minimise the deviations of the business cycle 'pendulum'; not to attempt to locate the 
macroeconomy at a point of other than 'rest'.  Phillips provided the theoretical explanation 
behind Christopher Dow's (1967) subsequent empirical analysis of the destabilising 
effects of fine tuning.  His curve, however, came to be interpreted as a proposition that 
ongoing inflation would reduce the rate of unemployment, which Phillips had specifically 
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cautioned against. 
 
The complete, recently rediscovered seminar records of the LSE Staff Seminar on 
Methodology, Measurement and Testing (M2T) capture the flavour of Phillips' influence. 
 (The records of the M2T Seminar series were titled by the words which head this 
section).  Richard Lipsey and his colleagues attempted to reconstruct economics as a 
series of empirically testable propositions.  Arnold Harberger - who had been closely 
associated with the Cowles Commission during the 1950s (Hildreth 1986, 64) and who 
shared Friedman's views of econometrics (correspondence from Friedman, April 18, 
1995) - attempted to persuade the M2T economists that their project was flawed because 
of the problem of the "back door alibi ... Testing is subjective ... infinite number of 
possible H [hypotheses] to explain anything ...  Trouble in econ[omics] - people will 
agree neither on which H are the most plausible nor on what experiment would be crucial 
.... Can't convince man who won't be convinced.  Have to depend on what 'seems 
sensible' ... Scientist builds up picture of world.  The more open to surprise the better.  
When surprised he amends picture.  World complicated, need intuition".  Richard Lipsey 
explained that "we want to be formal because we associate with people whose intuition 
we don't like and Harberger doesn't.  Why does Harberger wince whenever Archibald 
says 'rule'?".  Harberger replied: "Because these matters always subjective among the 
inquirers" (M2T Seminar notes, February and March 1958). 
 
Phillips presented a paper on The Problem of Refutation on 27 April 1960, and 18 May 
1960.  He argued that static theory could not be tested from time-series data.  Because of 
unstated maintained hypotheses, categorical statistical refutation was impossible.  
Autocorrelated time-series were treacherous data.  'Testing' was, in reality, little more 
than "measurement plus" (M2T Seminar notes).  It seems that Phillips was influential in 
effecting the retreat from the "Popperian notion of refutation" which Lipsey (1966, xx) 
drew attention to in the second edition of his Introduction to Positive Economics. 
 
Rowley and Wilton (1973, 385, 387) re-estimated various Phillips curves using 
Generalised Least Squares, and concluded that the "pseudo" t-values had been inflated by 
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at least 100 per cent in most cases: "one can only speculate whether the various authors 
would have advanced the Phillips curve model had they been faced with the GLS 
estimates rather than the OLS estimates".  Most of these models from the 1960s and early 
1970s had been plagued by the unacknowledged problem of autocorrelation.  Yet in the 
discussion following his paper on The Problem of Refutation, Phillips emphasised that 
with respect to data analysis he was only "happy if not autocorrelated" (M2T Seminar 
notes, May 1960).  It is, therefore, appropriate to label these doubts about the 
macroeconometric practices that culminated in the Keynesian Phillips curve, as the 
Keynes-Tinbergen-Friedman-Phillips Critique. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The history of econometrics is worthy of more attention amongst practicing 
econometricians than has hitherto been the case; it is a subject that should stand in equal 
status with other sub-disciplines within econometrics.  A disaggregated approach to 
Keynes' critique of econometrics reveals the nature of his objections to the underlying 
logic, and pretensions, of this relatively new approach to the analysis of economic data.  
His contemporaries were in no doubt as to the intensity of his hostility (Klein 1951, 450-
1).  Keynes did not soften his position; in fact, Tinbergen came increasingly to recognise 
the validity of some of Keynes' criticisms. 
 
There is a large degree of similarity between Keynes' position on econometrics and that of 
Friedman.  The econometric disputes between Keynesians and monetarists which raged in 
(and perhaps disfigured) the profession, were, from a methodological perspective, a 
sometimes ill-tempered conversation between Keynesians and the modern representative 
of Keynes.  Keynes' opposition to macroeconometrics was based on the suspicion that 
results derived from this method of analysis would come (illegitimately) to be regarded as 
decisive evidence.  This was also Friedman's suspicion.  Likewise, Phillips deserves to be 
credited with a good deal of insight into the fundamental weaknesses of the Phillips curve 
estimation industry. 
 
Gardiner Ackley (1961, 109) argued that historical misrepresentations (with respect to the 
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myth of the 'Klassical' whipping boys) could be analytically fruitful. But analytically, 
Keynesian macroeconometrics left behind some "jerry built structures" (Lucas 1977) - 
most notably the trade-off interpretation of the Phillips curve - although Phillips (1968) 
developed parts of the critique which was subsequently named after Robert Lucas (Court 
1999; Peter Phillips 1999).  Friedman, Marschak and Tinbergen have also been credited 
with a similar approach to econometric policy evaluation (Lucas 1976, 20; Pagan 1987, 
20).  Thus, the collapse of the Keynesian Phillips curves in the 1970s was a vindication of 
both the Keynes-Tinbergen-Friedman-Phillips and the Friedman-Marschak-Tinbergen-
Phillips Critiques.   
 
In his final posthumously published article, Keynes (1946, 177) bemoaned how much 
"modernist stuff, gone wrong and turned sour and silly is circulating".  Many aspects of 
his critique of econometrics retain their validity with respect to contemporary practices.  
Yet the tradition of "fancier econometric footwork" (Lucas 1976, 257) continues, often 
oblivious to some of the issues that alarmed Keynes, Friedman, Tinbergen, Phillips, et al. 
 
Stigler (1963a, 63) suggested that "methodological controversy has never had a marginal 
product (of scientific progress) above zero"; and this seems to capture Friedman's 
sentiments exactly. Friedman echoed Marshall's description of theory an "a 'language', 
designed to promote 'systematic and organised methods of reasoning' ".  Mitchell's style 
of research had fallen out of favour, in part, for reasons of "language rather than 
substance ..... and he uses no mathematics .... [but] his theoretical discussion can readily 
be translated into current jargon" (Friedman 1953, 7; 1950, 489).  Max Weber noted the 
tendency for intellectual opponents to avoid "the other's terminology as though it were his 
toothbrush" (cited by Haberler 1961, 40).  Samuelson's formalist work, Foundations of 
Economic Analysis (1947), included on its title page, the statement "Mathematics is a 
Language."  Keynesian methods overran NBER statistical business cycle research; but 
Friedman's polemical genius led him to use Keynesian language (IS-LM, income-
expenditure, money demand and econometrics) to effect a remarkable, if temporary, 
counter-revolution.  Clearly, econometrics has a subterranean history which too many 
econometricians are unaware of. 
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I do not wish to be misunderstood.  As David Hendry (1980, 395) put it, "some editors 
can be persuaded to publish on the basis of econometric fools-gold: caveat emptor, but do 
not denigrate the whole project".  Econometric evidence has illuminated many debates, 
and clarified some issues.  It was, for example, careful empirical work which revealed 
that the consumption-income ratio appeared to be constant over long periods (Kuznets 
1942, Goldsmith 1955), in contrast to the simple linear Keynesian consumption function 
(Keynes 1936a, chapter 8; Davis 1952).  Yet the large macroeconometric forecasting 
models have not drastically improved in predictive accuracy in the last three decades 
(Hendry 1980, 388; Leamer 1983, 42; Pagan 1987, 3-4; Epstein, 1987, 4; Rivlin 1987, 2; 
Zarnowitz 1992; Ormerod 1994, 3).  Neither can new classical macroeconometrics claim 
a greater degree of academic respectability than the Phillips curve equations which 
preoccupied applied econometricians in the 1960s.  Monetary targeting, often based on 
applied econometric research, was also a disappointment. In addition, Friedman's 
forecasts of a surge in U.S. inflation, beginning in mid-1984, and of a growth in real GNP 
of just 1 per cent for 1984:Q1, both proved to be inaccurate (Gordon 1987, 441). He also 
made an unfortunate prediction that "The world crude oil price cannot stay at 10$ a 
barrel; it will drop drastically within the next six or nine months ..." (1974a, 12).  
Likewise, Granger-Sims style tests of exogeneity of the money supply have yielded 
mixed results (Cagan 1989).  
 
Macroeconometric modelling, however, remains a lucrative business (Tobin 1977, 760; 
Galbraith 1987, 261-2). Ragnar Frisch (1970, 152) spoke of the "service to the 
econometrics fraternity by being critical and outspoken".  Clive Granger (1981, 124) has 
also appealed to model builders to pay more attention to econometric theory: "One 
wonders what has been the purpose of the work of the majority of theoretical 
econometricians for the last twenty years, or of a third of the pages of Econometrica". 
David Hendry (1980, 396) stated in his inaugural lecture that Keynes' critique should be 
"compulsory reading" for econometricians.  If applied econometricians paid as much 
attention to the history of their subject as they do to running regressions, this might 
improve the quality and reliability of the empirical side of our profession. 
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 NOTES 
 
 
                                                 
i. The question of how variables were measured, and in what units, left open the possibility of 
"devastating inconsistencies".  Secondly, the assumption of linearity with respect to all 
economic forces was, he thought, "ridiculous".  Thirdly, the arbitrary choice of the first and 
last year of a series for which a time trend is calculated, "looks to be a disastrous procedure" 
(Keynes 1939, 563-6; 1940, 155; see also Klein 1992, 184). 
ii.  A similar fate befell the Harvard Economic Society, whose econometric forecasts misread 
the downturn in 1929 (Galbraith 1987, 262). 
ii.  Inter-war business cycle research was dominated by the empirical projects of W.C. 
Mitchell and Warren M. Persons (Morgan 1990, 40).  During his period at the New School 
(1919-1922), Mitchell organised the NBER, which devoted its resources to the statistical 
investigation of the business cycle (Dorfman 1949, 456). Mitchell distrusted correlation 
techniques, and was concerned that invalid causal implications could be derived from them.  
He was alarmed by the possibility that professional ethical standards could become corrupted 
in this enlarged world of business cycle statistics, forecasts and funding: "[Economists] do not 
always decline the over-flattering invitation with the firmness which befits a scientific 
conscience" (cited by Dorfman 1959, 210). In its first research project, the NBER became 
engaged in an early econometric dispute about the validity of Pareto's 'law' of income 
distribution (Dorfman 1959, 204-5); and it was as Secretary to the NBER Conference on 
Research in Income and Wealth (1937-1940) that Milton Friedman became more of an 
economist than a statistician.  
ii.   Most students who have passed through the various econometrics courses offered by our 
profession would be forgiven for thinking that this subject lacked a systematically analysed 
history: "It is a minor scandal that there is no comprehensive history of either the rise of 
econometrics or the mathematisation of economics" (Weintraub 1985, 140).  In recent years 
we have benefited from some excellent research into the history of econometrics from Darnell 
(1984), Christ (1985), Epstein (1987), Morgan (1990), Darnell and Evans (1990), 
Keuzenkamp (1991), Dharmapala (1993), and others; plus the contributors to the special issue 
of Oxford Economic Papers (1989), edited by de Marchi and Gilbert. 
ii.  Tinbergen (1969, 43) wrote "Returning to models, I am sometimes wondering whether, 
upon looking at some recent work by planners, I should not repeat the famous words by 
Goethe's Zauberlehrling ...  'The ghosts I called I can't get rid of now'.  Sometimes indeed 
some of our followers overdo model building" [emphasis in original]. 
 
  Tinbergen (1979, 342-3) knew what Keynes meant: "Sometimes, indeed, intuition 
constitutes a basis for new scientific results.  It should be the intuition of a genius, however.  
For simpler souls, intuition may be less reliable".  
ii.  Frisch (1970, 165) quoted approvingly Norbert Weiner's remark about the economists' 
habit of "dressing up their rather imprecise ideas in the language of the infinitesimal 
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calculus", which was analogous to the vague feelings that "these magic rites and vestments 
will at once put them abreast of modern culture and technique".  Frisch concluded that "I am 
sorry to say that some econometricians have often been liable to forget these basic principles 
in practice and, therefore, have not been critical enough when they apply their techniques and 
mathematical analyses.  This remark is particular important when it is a question of drawing 
conclusions about the economic policy to be followed in a concrete situation" [emphasis in 
text].  Koopmans (1949, 70) stated that "The econometric approach is not a substitute for 
theory, but one of the servants of theory"; but later (1957, 170, 198) reflected that "in 
principle, tools have a servant's status ... if we look with a historian's interest at the 
development of a science, however, we find that tools also have a life of their own.  They may 
even come to dominate an entire period or school of thought  ... Our servants may thus 
become our guides, for better or for worse ... It should be kept in mind that the sharpness and 
power of these remarkable tools of inductive reasoning are bought by willingness to adopt a 
specification of the universe in a form suitable for mathematical analysis".     
ii.  Friedman knows more about the use and abuse of statistics than most economists:  he 
studied at Colombia University under the mathematical statistician Harold Hotelling (1933-
4); he was a statistical assistant to Henry Schultz at Chicago (1934-5); he worked with 
economic measurement and data analysis at the NBER (1937-40); he was Statistical Director 
of the Wisconsin Income Study (1940-1).  Friedman's early career either combined, or 
alternated between, mathematical statistics and economics.  For most of the war years, at 
least, he was exclusively concerned with mathematical statistics (Rose Friedman 1976, 22; 
Friedman 1988a, 83-6; Wallis 1980, 322). 
 
ii. Critics argued that they did not test the restrictions imposed, and they were accused of a 
misspecification, which influenced the outcome of the race, and were "setting up two 
strawmen and crowning one of them" (Desai 1981, 112, 104-6; Ando and Modigliani 1965; 
de Prano and Mayer 1965; Hester 1964). 
ii.  Koopman's rejoinder (1947) indicated that the pioneer econometricians did not regard the 
Keynes-Friedman critique as fatal to their project.  This brilliant group of scholars  (including 
nine future Nobel Laureates, Simon, Debreu, Becker, Arrow, Tobin, Koopmans, Modigliani, 
Markowitz and Klein) proceeded to lay the theoretical foundations of econometrics.  Eleven 
of the thirty three research associates (1939-1955) were elected to membership of the 
National Academy of Sciences, and twenty-two became presidents of major professional 
associations (Hildreth 1986, 111; Klein 1978, 326).  Frisch and Tinbergen shared the first 
Nobel Prize in Economics.  This econometric work was in stark contrast to the 'statistical 
economics' of Burns and Mitchell at the NBER, who, Koopmans believed, studied business 
cycles "as if they were the eruptions of a mysterious volcano" (cited by Epstein 1987, 64). 
ii.  "We the Lausanne people, were indeed so enthusiastic all of us about the new venture and 
eager to give and take, that we had hardly time to eat when we sat together at lunch or at 
dinner with our notes floating around on the table to the despair of the waiters" (Frisch 1970, 
152). It was what Martin Beckman called "the heroic age of econometrics" (cited by Craver 
and Leijonhufvud 1987, 181). 
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ii.  In the post-war period the "economics miracle" really took off: it was as if economics 
became the 'language' of government, and there was a great demand for those who spoke the 
language (Stein 1986).  Samuelson described the period from 1932-75 for economists as "the 
great wave of a Kondratieff expansion [for economists].  The New Deal and Welfare State 
created a vast new market for economists in government ... Then came the post-war boom in 
education" (1988, 60-1; Desai 1981, 55; Pesaran and Smith 1985, 148).  The 1940s and 1950s 
were the decades of enthusiasm and optimism for government planning, and this created a 
massive demand for advice from economists, often of a technical nature.  The entire 
economies of Japan and West Germany were available for experimentation.  The price 
mechanism had, it was believed, failed in the 1930s and had subsequently played little role in 
allocating resources during the war (at least at the governmental level).  Foreign aid and the 
Marshall Plan, would it was believed, restructure the non-communist world.  A new sub-
discipline, development economics, emerged, much influenced by the structuralist approach 
to planning (Little 1982, 76-85; Meier and Seers 1984).  The emerging welfare state required 
a broad tax base to fund it, and taxes came to be perceived primarily as a technical tool to be 
manipulated by policy makers in order to contain inflation.  A flavour of the confidence of the 
time can be sampled by reference to the papers by Marschak, Klein and Edward Teller, and 
Marschak and Klein (the latter delivered to the Econometrics Society meeting in 1946), 
which advocated an expenditure of 20 billion dollars per year over fifteen years to relocate all 
inhabitants of cities with over 50,000 inhabitants to ribbon cities or underground cities in 
order to minimise the effects of an atomic assault on the U.S. (Epstein 1987, 81, 95, n8). 
ii.  The pioneering optimism of this second wave was almost immediately confronted with 
scepticism.  The Institute for Mathematical Statistics meeting in Ithaca New York, in August 
1946 concluded that the Cowles group approach was unlikely to result in meaningful 
estimated parameters.  Little confidence was held out for future developments: "Data as bad 
as economic data" was incapable of accurately discriminating between alternative models 
(Tukey, cited by Epstein 1987, 100).  The attempt to derive an exact model of the capitalist 
system was derided by Schumpeter; Irving Fischer concluded that he had seen "a lot of people 
burn their fingers over discoveries of cycles.  The discoverer 'sees things' almost as bizarre as 
drunkards" (cited by Epstein 1987, 103).  The most persistent critic was Milton Friedman 
who presented to the 1947 Econometrics Society meeting a manifesto entitled 'A Monetary 
and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability" (1948a), which offered an alternative to the 
short-run stabilisation perspective of the Cowles workers.  Koopmans asked "can we meet the 
Friedman critique: that Christ's experiments have shown that the information contained in the 
data so far processed have been insufficient for good forecasting" (cited by Epstein 1987, 
111).  Marschak retreated from his previous position with respect to the NBER survey 
research method.  The Friedman critique, plus reviews by Arrow, Orcutt, Solow, Samuelson, 
Leontieff, Wold and others, plus disappointing empirical results, and an increasing awareness 
of the paucity of reliable data, effected a 'retreat from structure' from 1947: "the empirical 
work was an exhausting disappointment both for the tedium of computation and the lack of 
professional acceptance" (Epstein 1987, 110); "The econometric approach of the Cowles 
Commission seems to be petering out rapidly or not getting anywhere beyond extensive 
methodological discussions" (Haberler 1949, 84). 
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ii.  The Cowles econometricians were perceived to be seeking a "social analogue for 
Newtonian mechanics ... Tycho and Kepler are becoming fairly regular attenders of economic 
discussions these days" (Vining 1949, 80, 77).  This analogy was also prevalent among the 
LSE econometricians.  In September 1608, a trader at the annual Frankfurt Fair offered for 
sale a telescope which could magnify seven times.  In March, 1610, Galileo published his first 
booklet, a short but dramatic work, called Sidereus Nuncius, or Messenger from the Stars.  
The Universe would never appear to be the same again.  The walled-in Aristotelian universe, 
with its immutable social order, would be destroyed by a seventeen century retreat to the 
heliocentric perceptions of Aristarchus (Koestler, 1959, 43-65; Butterfield, 1957, 55-76).  
Exactly three-and-a-half centuries later, Phillips (November, 1958) and Lipsey (February, 
1960) turned the newly refined econometric telescope onto the problem of the behaviour of 
money wages during the course of the business cycle. With  pioneering optimism the M2T 
economists sought to use this telescope to turn economics into a fully empirical science.  
There was also an Aristotelian authority to be vanquished.  In the first edition of his textbook, 
Lipsey cited Robbins on empirical analysis: "But is it not desirable to transcend such 
limitations?  Ought we not to be in a position to give numerical values to the scales of 
valuation, to establish qualitative laws of supply and demand? ...  No doubt such knowledge 
would be useful.  But a moment's reflection should make it plain that we are here entering 
into a field of investigation where there is no reason to suppose that uniformities are to be 
discovered ...  Is it possibly reasonable to suppose that coefficients derived from the 
observations of a particular herring market at a particular time and place have any permanent 
significance - save as Economic History" [emphasis in text].  Lipsey (1966, 219, 218, n1) 
bemoaned that these views were "still held by economists".  In a seminar on "Refutation and 
Comparison", Kurt Klappholz also mentioned Robbins.  Chris Archibald retorted: "Robbins 
Aristotelian, not relevant" (M2T Seminar notes, 7 March 1958).  Further evidence of the 
importance of this historical analogy, is provided by the opening extract from Beveridge, and 
the final sentence, in Lipsey's (1966, xi-xii, 860-1) best selling textbook.  In seeking to 
rigorously scrutinise economic data they were aspiring to the highest standards of science.  
They hoped to resolve conflicts over perceptions and policies, and to effect a Newtonian-style 
revolution in economics.   
ii.  Econometric agnosticism, or at least reservations about policy relevance remained a 
minority taste in the 1960s, with potentially explosive critiques such as Phillips' (1968) being 
almost entirely ignored.  The exchange between Basmann and Klein and associates (in 
Brunner 1972) reflected the determination of practitioners to press on almost regardless.  
Unorthodox and problematic ideas tended to be ignored because they "would have 
inconveniently impeded the progress of econometrics at the time of its most rapid growth" 
(Desai 1981, 116-7, 120).  Applied econometrics in the age of the computer, and in the 
presence of an increasing demand for financially lucrative expert consultancy from 
government agencies, acquired an ad hoc character which was often cut adrift from 
professional disquiet.  The statistical economists believed that potential regularities and 
relationships could be revealed by an interaction with the data.  Econometricians believed that 
the data would 'speak' when a model had been imposed upon it.  Tinbergen was also very 
knowledgable about his data and was concerned about its quality.  Post-pioneering 
econometrics gradually entered a less creative, more mechanical phase, where concerns about 
the quality of the data were less prominent. Frisch and his co-workers were aware of the 
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possibilities of deriving "fictitious" results from econometric analysis (Epstein 1987, 91).  
Koopmans persistently, if vainly, emphasised the need to report all results, not just the 
preferred set.  Coal face enthusiasm for model estimation appeared to be largely oblivious to 
the scepticism and concern expressed by some about the lack of model evaluation.  
 
ii.  Don Patinkin (1976, 1095) found it "somewhat depressing to see how many of [Keynes' 
criticisms] are, in practice, still of relevance today".  Maurice Allais (1992, 35), a theoretical 
physicist, in addition to being the recipient of the 1988 Nobel Prize in economic science, 
bemoaned "the crop of pseudo-theories based on the mechanical application, devoid of any 
real intelligence, of econometrics and statistical techniques ... pseudo-models, accompanied 
by a mathematical-statistical panoply of untamed, totally unjustified economics which seem 
to the naive to be scientific theories, whereas they are generally just empty shells" [emphasis 
in original].  
